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The Relationship between Import Penetration and Operation of the U.S. Textile and 
Apparel Industries from 2002 to 2008 
 
Sheng Lu, University of Rhode Island 
Kitty Dickerson, University of Missouri 
Abstract 
          The U.S. textile and apparel (T&A) industries have respectively adopted various 
restructuring strategies in recent years which fundamentally changed the way the two industries 
operate and the shifting relationship of each sector with imports. This study empirically tests the 
relationship between import penetration and the operation of the U.S. T&A industries based on 
data at 4-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) code level from 2002-
2008. Results from the panel data model show that overall the U.S. textile industry formed a 
weak cooperative relationship with import penetration level in the U.S. market and a neutral 
relationship was suggested for the U.S. apparel industry with imports. These findings contribute 
to understanding the global nature of today’s U.S. T&A industries and suggest useful 
perspectives for the U.S. textile trade policies. 
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Introduction  1 
           Since 1960s, the United States has quickly become one of the largest importers of textile 2 
and apparel (T&A) in the world (Dickerson, 1999). In 2009, U.S. textile and apparel imports 3 
totaled $17.90 billion and $63.10 billion respectively, which were nearly four times as much as 4 
the import volume in 1990 (OTEXA, 2010).  Concurrent with the quick increase of imports, the 5 
U.S. domestic T&A industries suffered from steady reduction of output and great loss of 6 
employment, especially for those manufacturing-concentrated functions (Abernathy, Volpe, & 7 
Weil, 2006).  Understandably, imports were largely blamed for causing the difficult situation of 8 
the U.S. T&A industries (Nordas, 2004). More specifically, the rising import penetration ratio 9 
(IPR)—the percentage of domestic apparent consumption supplied by imports (Morgan, 1988, p. 10 
13), was often identified as the threatening and disruptive factor to the survival of the U.S. 11 
domestic textile and apparel firms (Krueger, 1996).   12 
          However, one important aspect of the story often overlooked is the dramatic restructuring 13 
process that has occurred in the U.S. T&A industries in response to globalization. For example, 14 
after abandoning most of the domestic production capacity in favor of outsourcing, U.S. apparel 15 
firms have established solid business relationships with apparel exporting countries, either 16 
through cut-and-sew contracts, opening and owning plants, or full package sourcing (Abernathy 17 
et al., 2006). Regional trade packs such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 18 
as well as the elimination of the quota system have also enabled the U.S. textile industry to form 19 
much closer ties with business partners outside the U.S. borders and to take greater advantage of 20 
resources on a global basis (Gereffi,1999). 21 
      Capturing the relationship between import penetration and the operation of the U.S. T&A 22 
industries in the globalized era is of value both to academia and government policy making.  For 23 
 
 
academia, this relationship is important to the understanding of the global nature of today’s T&A 24 
industries, particularly as to how the adoption of various restructuring strategies fundamentally 25 
transformed the way the industry functions in more developed economies. If a non-competing 26 
relationship different from the traditional view is suggested by the findings, it may call for 27 
rethinking the conclusions of many existing theories built upon old paradigms when 28 
globalization was far less influential in depth and in breadth. On the other hand, for policymakers, 29 
such relationship matters to the appropriateness of trade and industrial policies intended to create 30 
a favored environment for the U.S. domestic T&A industries.  In particular, trade restrictions 31 
stemmed from grave concerns about the negative impacts of import penetration. This perspective 32 
dominated U.S. textile trade policy for decades, resulting in the creation and implementation of 33 
various policy tools for the purpose of trade restriction (Dickerson, 1988).  However, if imports 34 
no longer pose a threat to the survival of the domestic industry, but rather the two have become 35 
“partners,” then a fundamental shift in the direction of policy might be suggested. 36 
     Although some studies have been conducted on related topics, research gaps still exist. For 37 
example, some studies either focused on the patterns of U.S. T&A imports (such as Nordas, 38 
2004) or explored the new business models of U.S. T&A firms as a result of adopting various 39 
restructuring strategies such as capitalization, mergers and acquisitions and outsourcing (such as 40 
Christoffersen & Datta, 2004; Kilduff, 2005; Parrish, Cassill, & Oxenham, 2006). However, little 41 
research has focused on imports as a potentially positive factor in the operation of today’s U.S. 42 
T&A industries. 43 
    This paper tried to fulfill the current research gaps by linking the level of import penetration 44 
with the operation of the U.S. T&A industries between 2002 to 2008. Specifically, two research 45 
questions were studied:  46 
 
 
1. By adopting the various industry restructuring strategies, do the U.S. domestic textile and 47 
apparel industries respectively incorporate imports into their operations?  48 
2.  Is the rising import penetration level still positively associated with the decline of the 49 
domestic U.S. textile and apparel industries after various industry restructuring strategies were 50 
adopted?   51 
       To be noted, the level of import penetration shall not be simply treated as the absolute 52 
volume of imports. This is because import penetration is determined jointly by the import 53 
volume and the level of apparent consumption in the importing country (Morgan, 1988, p. 13). 54 
Compared to the volume of imports, import penetration can more accurately reflect the role of 55 
imports in fulfilling the market demand relative to the domestic supply in the importing nation.    56 
 57 
Literature Review 58 
Import competition: theoretical views 59 
        Many studies in this area referred to the difficult time faced by the U.S. T&A industries 60 
over the past decades as the direct result of the intensive competition from rising imports 61 
(Christoffersen & Datta, 2004; Hodges & Karpova, 2006).  Some classic trade models are 62 
helpful in explaining why the U.S. T&A industry appeared to be negatively affected by rising 63 
imports, especially those less costly ones produced in the low-wage developing countries. 64 
        According to the Hecksher-Ohlin model (H-O model), countries usually export products for 65 
which it has abundant factors of production and import products for which it has scarce factors 66 
(Batra & Casas, 1973). As a capital-abundant country, the United States might be expected to 67 
specialize in producing comparatively capital intensive products such as machineries. These 68 
products would be exchanged for comparatively labor-intensive T&A products through trade 69 
 
 
with less-developed countries having more abundant, less costly labor. Despite the overall 70 
welfare gains in the United States, the H-O model suggested the “unfavorable” consequences for 71 
the import-competing T&A sector in terms of the lowered relative price in the U.S. market and 72 
decreased domestic output.    73 
          The factor-price equalization theorem (H-O-S model) developed by Paul Samuelson 74 
suggested that international trade will not only equalize the relative price of trading goods, but 75 
also will equalize the factor price in these countries both in relative and absolute terms (Salvatore, 76 
2004). This conclusion implies that when importing T&A from lower-wage less developed 77 
countries, wage levels in the U.S. T&A industries will be “forced” to go downward until 78 
reaching the same level with less-developed countries (Baldwin, 2008). 79 
        The Rybczynski theorem further argues that holding the price of trading goods in a country 80 
constant, the increase of one production factor will result in disproportionally more production of 81 
the product intensively using that production factor (Krugman, 2005). Based on the Rybezynski 82 
theorem, much quicker capital growth in relation to the labor force in the United States will 83 
result in disproportionate reduction of comparatively labor-intensive T&A production.  84 
Import penetration and heterogeneity of the U.S. T&A industries 85 
          Historically the U.S. T&A industries, especially the textile sector, unswervingly called for 86 
restricting the flood of imports dominating the U.S. domestic market. However, data suggest that 87 
the status of import penetration in some segments of the U.S. T&A industries may different from 88 
public perception.  By the end of 2008, IPR in the U.S. textile industry (defined by North 89 
America Industry Classification System NAICS 313 in this study) was still at a relatively modest 90 
level of 29.1% measured by gross output and 17.9% measured by shipment (U.S. Census Bureau, 91 
2010; U.S. International Trade Commission, USITC, 2010). This figure means that the majority 92 
 
 
of market demand for fiber, yarn, thread and fabrics in the United States was still supplied by the 93 
U.S.-made textiles instead of by imports. In comparison, the IPR in the U.S. apparel industry 94 
(defined by NAICS 315 in this study) was at a much higher level of 84.3% by gross output and 95 
79.5% by shipment. On the other hand, although IPR in both textile and apparel industries are on 96 
the rise over the past 10 years, the growth rate is much lower for the textile industry compared to 97 
the apparel industry.  From 2000 to 2008, IPR in the U.S. textile industry only gained 8.9 98 
percentage points while imported apparel gained more than 20 percentage points in additional 99 
market share (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010; USITC, 2010). 100 
       The disparity of the U.S. textile industry and the apparel industry in terms of their IPR level 101 
reflects the heterogeneous nature of the two industries. In general, textile manufacturing is 102 
comparatively more capital and technology intensive than apparel manufacturing (Nordas, 2004). 103 
Because of the abundance in capital factors, the United States enjoys more comparative 104 
advantage in relatively capital-intensive textile production in relation to imports from labor-105 
abundant less-developed countries. Similarly, import penetration ratio is higher in the U.S. 106 
apparel industry because of the more labor-intensive nature of apparel production which favors 107 
less-developed countries.  108 
Structural change of the U.S. T&A industries 109 
         The heterogeneity of textile and apparel production further affects the nature of structural 110 
change and selection of restructuring strategies by the two industries. In terms of the U.S. textile 111 
industry, first, the industry boosted production by investing in new machines, equipment, and 112 
technology (Christoffersen et al., 2004). Capital intensity of the industry measured by the capital-113 
labor ratio, increased by nearly 20% from 2002 to 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). 114 
Capitalization and investment in technology also led to the higher productivity and lower cost of 115 
 
 
textile production (Levinsohn & Petropoulos, 2001). Datta & Christoffersen (2005) suggested 116 
that labor saving technical progress helped the U.S. textile industry improve its productivity by 117 
2.1% and reduced production cost by 2.4% annually from 1953 to 2001.   118 
        Second, many U.S. textile firms enlarged production capacity through mergers and 119 
acquisitions (M&A) with the main purposes of taking advantage of economies of scale and 120 
achieving lower production cost (Mock, 2002). The adoption of the M&A strategy may explain 121 
why large firms remain a good proportion in the U.S. textile industry despite the overall decline 122 
of the total number of firms (Christoffersen et al., 2004). Empirical studies further suggested that 123 
plants that survived in the U.S. textile industry emerged with stronger competitiveness while 124 
those that exited were comparatively less productive (Chi, Kilduff, & Dyer, 2009).  125 
       Third, the U.S. textile mills improved supply chain management. As customers’ demands for 126 
apparel products have become more volatile and unpredictable with a shorter life cycle, textile 127 
production is expected to be more “sensitive” to quick market changes (Christopher, Lowson & 128 
Peck, 2004).  Two main categories of strategies have been widely adopted in the U.S. textile 129 
industry: one category is lean supply with the goal of reducing inventories and shortening the 130 
delivery time, and the other is agile supply which intends to deliver the products more 131 
“efficiently” by making the high volatility products available to the customers (Oh & Kim, 132 
2007). Specific supply chain management strategies commonly applied by the U.S. textile 133 
industry include quick response (QR), automatic replenishment, just-in-time (JIT) systems, point 134 
of sale information, and mass customization (Oh &  Kim, 2007). 135 
        Fourth, the U.S. textile industry actively engaged in the building of regional production 136 
networks with countries that are geographically close to the United States. This strategy received 137 
strong support from U.S. trade policymakers by intentionally adding special provisions 138 
 
 
encouraging the use of United States-made yarns or fabrics in the preferential trade agreements 139 
reached with trading partners (Gereffi, Spener & Bair, 2002). In these agreements, imports from 140 
partner countries receive preferential tariff treatment. By the end of 2009, the United States had 141 
reached eleven such free-trade agreements and four preferential trade agreements with less-142 
developed countries mostly located in the Americas. Statistics from the Office of Textile and 143 
Apparel (OTEXA) indicated that from 2000 to 2009, more than 50% of U.S. textile mill exports 144 
went to partners under the NAFTA and DR-CAFTA.  145 
          Compared with the U.S. textile industry, the U.S. apparel industry had a more difficult 146 
time facing the flood of imports coming from the low-wage countries. High domestic production 147 
cost, especially labor, is regarded as one of the greatest disadvantages for the U.S. apparel 148 
industry to compete on price (Gereffi et al., 2002). On the other hand, contrary to the case in the 149 
textile industry, the nature of apparel manufacturing makes it quite difficult to incorporate 150 
automation (Dickerson, 1999).  151 
           Over time as retailers bought increasing quantities of low cost imports, the fierce 152 
competition caused the U.S. apparel industry to abandon most of the domestic production 153 
capacity in favor of outsourcing and offshore sub-contracting (Kim & Rucker, 2005). Gereffi et 154 
al. (2002) proposed that two types of apparel firms emerged quickly in the industry: one is 155 
“marketers,” which are engaged in design and marketing activities and characterized as 156 
manufacturers without factories (such as Liz Claiborne (prior to name change) and Ralph 157 
Lauren). The other type is “branded manufacturers” which still deal with activities ranging from 158 
design, cutting, assembly, laundry to marketing (such as Levi Strauss and VF Corporation). 159 
However, the key role of “branded manufacturers” is to organize and oversee the whole 160 
production process rather than simply manufacture by themselves (Gereffi et al., 2002). Over 161 
 
 
time, these distinctions are less clear, however, for both “marketers” and “branded 162 
manufacturers,” or other types that emerge, their operations are based on the close contracting 163 
networks with overseas companies, especially manufacturers in the less-developed countries.  164 
These transformed U.S. apparel firms did not regard imports as competitors. Quite the opposite, 165 
a large portion of U.S. apparel imports actually were arranged by “marketers” and “branded 166 
manufacturers.” 167 
         Ironically, U.S. retailers became the emerging competitors for U.S. apparel firms. Although 168 
retailers were the customers of apparel firms, they became ambitious in establishing their own 169 
sourcing network so as to shorten the lead time, reduce the sourcing cost, and enhance their 170 
margins (Gereffi et al., 2002; Dickerson, 1999).  At the same time, some large-scale-U.S. apparel 171 
firms, including branded manufacturers have also extended their business realm into the retailing 172 
sector by means of forward integration (Kilduff, 2005). The phenomenon of “scrambled 173 
softgoods chain” within which some traditional steps in the supply-chain are skipped may also be 174 
found in the U.S. apparel industry (Dickerson, 1999).  175 
          On the other hand, although imported apparel through sourcing networks has played a 176 
dominant role in supplying the U.S. apparel market, the U.S. apparel industry still maintains 177 
certain local production bases, such as in New York and Los Angeles (Bailey-Todd, Eckman, & 178 
Tremblay, 2008).  Compared with imports which target the mass market and achieve profits on 179 
high volumes, this locally produced apparel, in most cases, serve a U.S. niche market. They cater 180 
to particular needs from the retail customers on quality and flexibility and compete mostly on 181 
non-price factors, such as design and service (Parrish et al., 2006).   182 
 183 
Research Conceptual Models and Hypotheses 184 
 
 
       Figure 1 and Figure 2 present the conceptual models illustrating the theoretically-suggested 185 
relationship between import penetration and the operation of the U.S. T&A industries when 186 
taking their respective restructuring strategies into consideration.  187 
 188 
Figure 1 Here 189 
       In terms of the U.S. textile industry (Figure 1), most of its restructuring strategies intend to 190 
focus on building a stronger domestically-based production capability rather than offshore 191 
production (Kilduff, 2005). This makes the U.S. domestic apparel manufacturers remain 192 
important customers1  to the U.S. textile industry. However the rising import penetration ratio 193 
means the U.S. domestic demand for textiles is fulfilled by a growing volume of imports rather 194 
than U.S.-made textile products. The loss of market share suggests the U.S. textile industry 195 
suffers from rising imports. Therefore, this study proposes:  196 
         Hypothesis 1: After restructuring, the U.S. domestic textile industry still directly 197 
competes with imports. Therefore, a higher import penetration ratio shall be positively 198 
associated with the decline of the U.S. textile industry and vice versa. 199 
 200 
Figure 2 Here 201 
          In terms of the U.S. apparel industry (Figure 2), with the adoption of various restructuring 202 
strategies, it has achieved global operations with traditional manufacturing-oriented functions 203 
largely replaced by offshore production and outsourcing (Kilduff, 2005). Under the new business 204 
model, on one hand, a good proportion of imports were brought into the U.S. market by the U.S. 205 
apparel firms themselves, whose commercial success was heavily dependent on the efficient 206 
cooperation with contracted apparel manufacturers overseas. On the other hand, as the 207 
 
 
transformed U.S. apparel industry treats imported apparel as an integral part of the supply chain 208 
instead of competitors, the rising import level reflected by a higher import penetration ratio may 209 
no longer imply the U.S. apparel industry “lost” in competing with imports. Although certain 210 
domestic apparel manufacturing capacity remained in the United States, in most cases these 211 
operations fulfill the needs of the niche market and are supplementary to the imports which 212 
basically serve the mass consumer markets (Gereffi, 2001). As the nature of the game has largely 213 
changed from zero-sum competition into cooperation, operation of the restructured U.S. apparel 214 
industry shall not be negatively affected by rising imports.  Therefore, the study proposes:          215 
          Hypothesis 2: After restructuring, the U.S. domestic apparel industry no longer 216 
competes with imports. Therefore, a higher import penetration ratio shall be either 217 
negatively or neutrally associated with the decline of the U.S. apparel industry and vice 218 
versa. 219 
 220 
Methodology  221 
Empirical Model Structure 222 
      This study develops a revised model based on the work of Greenaway, Hine &Wright (1999) 223 
to empirically test the hypothesis. First, assume for a 4-digit NAICS industry i in period t , sitQ  224 
represents the domestic supply of U.S. T&A industries, ditQ represents the total U.S. market 225 
demand. Import supply itM is defined as the difference of U.S. market demand and domestic 226 
supply. Based on the common definition, such as that used by Morgan (1988), import penetration 227 
ratio ( itIPR ) is calculated as the share of imports within the total U.S. demand: 228 
           
1
d s s
it it it it
it d d d
it it it
M Q Q QIPR
Q Q Q
−
= = = −
                                                                                       
(1) 229 
 
 
         Second, to describe the behavior of U.S. domestic supply of T&A, assuming Cobb-Douglas 230 
production function is sit it it itQ A K L
λ α β= ⋅  , where itAλ  denotes total factor productivity which 231 
changes over time; K and L respectively represents capital and labor input with output elasticity 232 
at α and β .  233 
       To maximize profit, marginal revenue product of labor (MPL) of industry i in period t shall 234 
equal its wage ( itW ) level and marginal revenue product of capital (MPK) shall equal rent ( itC ). 235 
As most concerns for the impacts of import competition are concentrated on the labor side, K is 236 
further expressed as a function of parameter L, W and C, so that sitQ  will be directly dependent 237 
on employment and wage level. By solving equations simultaneously, we get  238 
         
s
it it it it it it it
it
it it it it
P Q P L W L WK
C P C C
α α α
β β
= = =
                                                                                 
(2) 239 
            Third, in term of the behavior of U.S. total domestic demand for industry i in period t , 240 
assume 1 2
it
b bd
it tQ B P Y= ⋅ ⋅  , where itP denotes the market price of industry i in period t ; tY  is the 241 
real national income of the United States.  1b  measures the price elasticity of demand in a ceteris 242 
paribus condition, i.e. the percentage change of demand for industry i given one percentage 243 
change of market price when other factors hold constant;  2b  measures impact of aggregate 244 
income elasticity for industry i , i.e., the percentage change of the U.S. demand for industry i  245 
given one percentage change of U.S. national income. B is constant. 246 
      Finally, replacing
it
sQ  and 
it
dQ  in Equation 2 and taking logarithm of both sides, we have: 247 
 248 
0 1 2 3 4 5(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it it it it it tLn IPR Ln A Ln L Ln W Ln P Ln Yφ φ φ φ φ φ− = + + + + +                       (3)       249 
        where 0 ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ( )Ln B Ln Cφ α α α β= − − −  ; 1φ λ=  ; 2 =φ α β+ ; 3φ α= ; 4 1bφ = − ; 5 2bφ = − ;
 
 250 
 
 
        In particular, we are interested in the value of the following parameters: 251 
• 1φ  (elasticity of supply associated with productivity): which measures the impact of 252 
productivity change of the U.S. domestic T&A industries on its market share in relation 253 
to imports in the U.S. market. As productivity is positively associated with the supply of 254 
U.S.-made T&A, when imports directly compete with U.S. product, productivity growth 255 
will result in the rising market share of U.S. domestic products. Therefore, we expect 256 
0 1: 0H φ > ; 1 1: 0H φ ≤  for the U.S. textile industry; and 0 1: 0H φ ≤ ; 1 1: 0H φ >  for the 257 
U.S. apparel industry. 258 
• 2φ (elasticity of labor input): which measures the impact of labor input (employment) of 259 
the U.S. textile and apparel industries on their market share in the United States in 260 
relation to imports. As in the case of productivity growth, when imports directly compete 261 
with U.S. products, the increase of labor supply will result in domestic supply increasing 262 
market shares. Therefore, we expect 0 2: 0H φ > ; 1 2: 0H φ ≤  for the U.S. textile industry; 263 
and 0 2: 0H φ ≤ ; 1 2: 0H φ >  for the U.S. apparel industry.  264 
•  3φ (elasticity of wage level): which measures the impact of relative wage level of the U.S. 265 
T&A industries on its market share in the United States in relation to imports. When 266 
productivity is held constant, the rising wage level should be the result of rising product 267 
price as MPL ML P W= ⋅ = . If imports directly compete with U.S. products, in this 268 
occasion, supply curve of the U.S. domestic T&A industries will decline. Therefore, we 269 
expect 0 3: 0H φ < ; 1 3: 0H φ ≤  for the U.S. textile industry; and 0 3: 0H φ ≥ ; 1 3: 0H φ <  for 270 
the U.S. apparel industry. 271 
 
 
• 4φ (elasticity of price elasticity): which measures the impact of market price on the market 272 
share of U.S. domestic made T&A products. When imports directly compete with U.S. 273 
products and both demand and supply are held constant, rising market price will 274 
encourage U.S. domestic T&A industries to increase supply and leave less demand for 275 
imports to fulfill. Therefore, we expect 0 4: 0H φ > ; 1 4: 0H φ ≤ for the U.S. textile 276 
industry; and 0 4: 0H φ ≤ ; 1 4: 0H φ >  for the U.S. apparel industry.  277 
• 5φ (elasticity of demand/income elasticity): which measures the impact of aggregate 278 
demand of the United States (aggregate income) on the share of its domestic-made T&A 279 
products in the market.  Enlarged domestic demand will raise the market price and result 280 
in more domestic supply. Therefore, when imports directly compete with U.S. products, 281 
we expect 0 5: 0H φ > ; 1 5: 0H φ ≤  for the U.S. textile industry; and 0 5: 0H φ ≤ ; 282 
1 5: 0H φ >  for the U.S. apparel industry.  283 
         For the empirical test, two additional variables are included in Equation 3.  284 
         One is the dummy variable Quota , which is used to capture the potential impacts of the 285 
elimination of the quota system on the import penetration level. As variable 0Quota = for years 286 
2002-2004 and 1Quota = for years 2005-2008, parameter 6φ can reveal whether IPR has any 287 
structural changes in the post-quota era due to the significant changes of the” rules of game.” 288 
       Another variable is t, which is used to capture the potential time trend that existed in the data. 289 
Failing to control the time trend may result in a spurious regression problem (Wooldridge, 2002), 290 
especially when time-series data are not stationary.     291 
        Besides, ic refers to the possible unobserved sectoral effect and itµ denotes error terms. 292 
Because of the interconnection between the textile industry and the apparel industry, simply 293 
 
 
simulating the Equation 3 individually for each 4-digit NAICS code is likely to result in biased 294 
estimation of parameters due to the correlation among itµ  for different textile and apparel 295 
subsectors (Wooldridge, 2002).   296 
        To achieve unbiased and consistent estimation, the panel data modeling technique is 297 
adopted in this study, which is specifically developed to tackle a dataset involving both cross-298 
sectional and time-series data. Compared to the traditional cross-sectional regression, a panel 299 
data model can help solve the potential problem of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in the 300 
dataset and reveal the potential dynamics in the dataset which cannot be detected by the cross-301 
sectional regression (Wooldridge, 2002).  Moreover, the generalized least square (GLS) method 302 
instead of pooled ordinary least square (POLS), is used to ensure consistent and efficient 303 
estimation of the parameters. GLS has the advantages of tolerating a certain degree of correlation 304 
among independent variables (Wooldridge, 2002). This is particularly useful in this study given 305 
the linkage among productivity, wage level and employment size in Equation 3. 306 
Data Source 307 
        Data used in this study came from various U.S. government agencies, which are the best 308 
sources available for official national-level aggregated industry and trade statistics.  Except for 309 
otherwise noted, all data were collected at the 4-digit NAICS code level1, so as to make industry 310 
performance and trade activities compatible with each other. More specifically:  311 
        For import penetration ratio (variable IPR ), volumes of imports for each 4-digit NAICS 312 
code sectors were measured in dollar terms (USITC, 2010). Domestic supply of each 4-digit 313 
NAICS code U.S. T&A industry was measured by the total value of shipments (U.S. Census, 314 
2010). In particular, by the U.S. Census’s definition, value of shipment means the total value of 315 
all products shipped by the producers (U.S. Census, 2010). Therefore, this index is more 316 
 
 
appropriate than production output to reflect the U.S. domestic supply of textiles and apparel in 317 
the market. Employment level (variable L ) was measured by the total number of employees (U.S. 318 
Department of Labor, 2010a). Wage level (variable W ) was measured by the average hourly 319 
earnings of all employees either in the U.S. textile industry or in the apparel industry (U.S. 320 
Department of Labor, 2010a). Productivity (variable A ) was measured by the productivity index 321 
(year 2002=100) (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010b). According to the Bureau of Labor 322 
Statistics, definition, labor productivity is the “ratio of output of goods and services to the labor 323 
hours devoted to the production of that output.” Producer price index (PPI) was used as the 324 
proxy for market price (variable P ) (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010b). According to the 325 
definition of BLS, PPI measures the average change over time in the selling prices received by 326 
domestic producers for their output (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010c). Last but not least, 327 
aggregate demand (income) in the United States was measured by Gross Domestic Product (U.S. 328 
Department of Commerce, 2010). 329 
        Data used in this study range from 2002 through 2008. Year 2002 was the first time when 330 
statistics collected based on NAICS were available. Prior to that, industry activities in the United 331 
States were collected based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, whose 332 
industry classification method was different and incompatible with NAICS. Further, because of 333 
time lag in availability of government data at the time of the study the latest statistics based on 334 
NAICS was through 2008.   335 
 336 
Results and Discussions 337 
Relationship Between Imports and the U.S. T&A Industry: Empirical results 338 
 
 
        First, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (BP) test was conducted to see whether 339 
unobserved sectoral effect ic was present. As Chi-square of the BP test is 58.00 (p=0.01), 340 
therefore at 95% confidence level we reject the null hypothesis, i.e., unobserved sectoral effect 341 
ic was suggested present in the empirical model (5).   342 
      Second, the Hausman test was conducted to see whether the unobserved sectoral effect ic was 343 
correlated with other independent variables in Equation 3. For the U.S. textile industry, Chi-344 
squares of the Hausman test is 5.0 (p=0.08), therefore at 95% confidence level, we fail to reject 345 
the null hypothesis, i.e. sectoral effect ic is suggested uncorrelated with other independent 346 
variables. In such case, both the fixed effect model (FE) and the random effect model (RE) can 347 
generate consistent estimation. However, RE estimation usually is more efficient than FE 348 
(Wooldridge, 2002), therefore RE is chosen for studying the U.S. textile industry. For the U.S. 349 
apparel industry, Chi-squares of the Hausman test is 10.57 (p=0.01) P-value=0.01<0.05, 350 
therefore at 95% confidence level, we reject the null hypothesis. Fixed effect model (FE) 351 
therefore is chosen for studying the U.S. apparel industry and its relationship with import 352 
penetration level. 353 
        Third, RE and FE models were run by STATA 10.0 and the estimation results were shown 354 
in Table 1 (A) and (B). For both RE and FE model, P-value of the F-statistics were smaller than 355 
0.01 at the 95% confidence level. This suggests that overall the dependent variable 356 
1 itIPR− which measures the share of U.S. domestic-made T&A in the U.S. market, has strong 357 
correlation with independent variables describing the operation of the U.S. textile and apparel 358 
industries, namely productivity, employment, wage level, market price and GDP.  359 
Table 1 (A) and (B) here 360 
 
 
         According to Table 1 (A), Hypothesis 1 which suggests a “competing” relationship 361 
between imports and the U.S. domestic textile output was not supported. In most cases, import 362 
penetration level seems independent of the operation of the U.S. textile industry.  Changes of the 363 
productivity and wage level of the U.S. textile industry were both suggested having no 364 
statistically significant impacts on the changes of the import penetration level.  Neither did the 365 
market price nor aggregate U.S. demand show a significant relationship with the import 366 
penetration level. The only exception occurs in the case of employment. Results in Table 1 (A) 367 
imply that expansion of the workforce in the U.S. textile industry will not help the U.S. textile 368 
industry gain more market share in the domestic market, but rather will end up with more 369 
imports.  Moreover, the estimated parameter for the dummy variable quota  is not statistically 370 
significant, suggesting that impact of the quota elimination did not lead to changes of the import 371 
penetration level in the U.S. textile industry as a whole.  372 
        Hypothesis 2 was supported by the empirical results shown in Table 1 (B).  Overall, results 373 
suggested the operation of the U.S. apparel industry and imports were “immune” to each other. 374 
Variables describing operation of the U.S. apparel industry were mostly found having no 375 
statistically significant impacts on the relative market position of imports in relation to U.S. 376 
domestic output. This means a rising import penetration in the U.S. market was not associated 377 
with negative development of the U.S. domestic apparel industry. Moreover, empirical results 378 
suggest that holding other variables constant, 1% change of the U.S. market price would result in 379 
0.5% decline of the market share of the domestic output in the same direction. This means 380 
imports will continue increasing when output of the U.S. domestic-made apparel moves toward 381 
the higher-end of the market.  On the other hand, as the case in the U.S. textile industry, no 382 
 
 
evidence shows that elimination of the quota system had resulted in change of the overall level of 383 
U.S. apparel imports2.  384 
 385 
Discussion  386 
      Despite some inconsistencies with the two hypotheses, results of the empirical tests may still 387 
be explained by certain factors. For the U.S. textile industry, first, with shrinkage of U.S. 388 
domestic demand, operation of the U.S. textile industry relied more heavily on its performance in 389 
overseas markets. With a growing proportion of industry output shipped outside the U.S. border, 390 
it may explain why import penetration ratio could still rise when the U.S. domestic fiber, yarn 391 
and thread mills improve productivity, enlarge employment, and raise wage level. When the U.S. 392 
textile industry no longer specifically targets the domestic market, it seems reasonable that 393 
neither the rising market price nor the expanded aggregate demand (income) in the United States 394 
results in more industry supply.  395 
       Second, although the U.S. textile industry still largely focuses on domestic production after 396 
the adoption of various restructuring strategies, the industry may still have undergone substantial 397 
structural changes reflected on the nature of its output. Statistics show that, only 14% of the total 398 
U.S. fiber output was used for apparel production by the end of 2008, reduced from 18% in 2004 399 
(Fiber Organon, 2009). In comparison, technical textiles which was widely used in military, 400 
healthcare/medical, construction, engineering and agriculture industries (Dickerson, 1999; Chi, 401 
2010), accounted for 41% of total fiber usage in the United States in 2008, increased from 34 % 402 
in 2004 (Fiber Organon, 2009). It is likely that although imported textiles and the U.S. domestic 403 
textile output were counted under the same 4-digit NAICS code, they were heterogeneous in 404 
nature with different end-use purposes.  405 
 
 
          As for the U.S. apparel industry, first, the results may due to the fact that the U.S. domestic 406 
apparel output and imported apparel target different segments of the U.S. market. As proposed in 407 
Figure 2, while imports largely fulfill the demand from mass market, the U.S. domestic-made 408 
apparel has narrowed their focus to niche markets in the United States whose preferences give 409 
more weight to added values, services or speed of product delivery that cannot be easily fulfilled 410 
by imports (Parrish et al, 2006).  Some niche markets are created by U.S. legislation, such as the 411 
Berry Amendment3.  When target markets had little in overlap, it is not too surprising to see that 412 
operation of the U.S. apparel industry had minimum impact on the ebb and flow of imports.              413 
         Second, statistical insignificance of the empirical results could also attribute to the fact that 414 
multiple parties in the U.S. softgoods industry are involved in importing apparel. In particular, it 415 
has become a common practice for large apparel retailers in the United States to set up 416 
departments solely responsible for global sourcing of an increasing share of private-label 417 
products in their total sales (Dickerson, 1999). However, under the NAICS system, apparel 418 
retailers (NAICS 448) and apparel firms (NAICS 315) were classified separately, which means 419 
their industry activities such as output, productivity and employment were independently 420 
collected and released.  Unfortunately retailers’ participation in international trade currently is 421 
not traced and reported by official statistical sources.  Since apparel imports sourced by retailers 422 
have reached a sizable scale but cannot be separated from total import volumes, it unavoidably 423 
weakens the sensitivity of data in reflecting the actual linkage between imports and the operation 424 
of the U.S. apparel industry (NAICS 315).   425 
         Third, the diversity of apparel products may further complicate the empirical estimation of 426 
the relationship between imports and the operation of the U.S. domestic firms.  In contrast to the 427 
highly standardized textiles products such as fiber, yarn and fabric, apparel products are more 428 
 
 
heterogeneous in nature due to consumers’ seeking of uniqueness. Apparel imports from 429 
different sources have demonstrated a wide range of average price measured by dollars per 430 
square meters (SME). Some studies already argue that origin of imports matters for their impact 431 
on an importing country’s domestic industries (Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006).  Similarly, the 432 
proposed cooperation between imports and the operation of the U.S. apparel industry could be 433 
more remarkable if empirical tests were narrowed down to a smaller group of apparel firms and 434 
imports from certain geographic regions. 435 
 436 
Conclusions and Implications  437 
      This study empirically evaluated the relationship between import penetration and the 438 
operation of the U.S. textile and apparel industries by using a panel data model based on data at 439 
4-digit NAICS code ranging from 2002 through 2008. 440 
        First, the random effect model suggests that overall the U.S. textile industry formed a weak 441 
cooperative relationship with imports in the U.S. market. Specifically, employment size of the 442 
U.S. textile industry was found negatively associated with its market share in relation to imports 443 
in the U.S. market.  However, no evidence showed that productivity and wage level of the U.S. 444 
domestic textile industry nor the aggregate demand in the United States had statistically 445 
significant impacts on the import penetration level in the U.S. textile market. Nor was the 446 
elimination of the quota system in 2005 shown to have statistically significant impact on the 447 
overall import penetration level in the U.S. textile market.  448 
       Second, the fixed effect model suggests that the U.S. apparel industry overall formed a 449 
neutral relationship with imports in the U.S. market. No evidence indicated that productivity, 450 
employment and wage level of the U.S. domestic apparel industry as well as the aggregate 451 
 
 
demand in the United States had statistically significant impacts on the import penetration level 452 
in the U.S. apparel market.  However, market price was found negatively associated with the 453 
share of U.S. domestic-made apparel in the U.S. market. Similar to the case in the U.S. textile 454 
industry, impact of the quota elimination on the import penetration level in the U.S. apparel 455 
market was found not statistically significant.  456 
         Findings of this study have several important implications both regarding the evolution of 457 
the U.S. textile and apparel industries and many broader issues critical to the global economy 458 
and its governance in the 21st century.  First, results of this study present a somewhat more 459 
encouraging picture of the current status of the U.S. textile and apparel industries than many 460 
previous studies suggested. Although pessimistic and stereotyped public images of a dying U.S. 461 
textile and apparel industry are to an extent still popular, this study argues that the two industries 462 
overall have stabilized as a result of their sweeping restructuring.  In particular, indexes often 463 
used to measure the size of an industry such as employment and output may not be solely 464 
appropriate for evaluating an industry which is undergoing significant structural changes.  465 
Instead, a more comprehensive and objective assessment of the conditions of the U.S. textile and 466 
apparel industries should also take aspects such as product structure, productivity growth, 467 
demand for occupations at different skill levels and export dependency rate into consideration. 468 
Overall, it is important to keep in mind that both the U.S. textile and apparel industries today are 469 
but a shadow of what they were even a decade ago. However, the two industries have survived 470 
through strategic transformation and are expected to continue development in the future.  471 
         Second, findings of this study raise questions on whether there is a basis to be nervous 472 
about rising imports, especially in the context of an integrated global economy in which global 473 
fragmented production and trade networks predominate. Actually, the validity of arguments 474 
 
 
stressing the adverse impacts of rising imports largely depends on the assumption that imports 475 
and output of importer’s domestic industry necessarily constitute a “zero-sum” game. However, 476 
this assumption is questionable when international trade in an integrated global economy today is 477 
no longer arm’s-length transaction in nature (Cattaneo, Gereffi & Staritz, 2010).  Findings of this 478 
study also pose challenges to the “zero-sum” game assumption. The suggested non-competing 479 
relationship implies that not only has the U.S. apparel industry extensively incorporated imports 480 
into its global-based operation, but also the U.S. textile industry may benefit from imports and 481 
offshore production, although the detailed mechanism needs further exploration.  482 
        Perhaps findings of this research call for shifting the orientation of U.S. textile and apparel 483 
trade policy from focusing on import restriction to greater export promotion. To a large extent, 484 
curbing the growth of imports dominates the history of the U.S. textile and apparel trade policy 485 
over the past 40 years. Such single-focused policy orientation reflects certain policymakers’ 486 
strong suspicion, skepticism and deep anxiety about rising imports and their presumed negative 487 
impacts on the health of the U.S. domestic industries. However, evidence provided in this study 488 
shows that with the adoption of various restructuring strategies, maintaining today’s U.S. textile 489 
and apparel industries largely depend on the free flow of goods and services across the borders. 490 
Even if imports were restricted, those lost jobs—mostly low-skill types, would not simply go 491 
back to the United States as wished. Instead, with the rising dependency on markets outside the 492 
U.S. border, perhaps policymakers should more wisely spend precious policy resources to 493 
strengthen the competiveness of U.S. textiles and apparel products in the global marketplace 494 
which is of growing importance to the industries’ future prosperity.  495 
         Despite the interesting and meaningful results of the findings, several changes might be 496 
made to further improve the quality of the future similar studies. First, it could be better if longer 497 
 
 
time-series data were available. A longer time-series data will help improve the overall reliability 498 
of the estimation by increasing the number of data points and degrees of freedom for the model. 499 
However, cautions should also be given to the possible new “noises” brought in with data from a 500 
longer time span. For example, if data prior than 2002 were used in the model, questions arise on 501 
how to deal with China’s WTO accession effect as well as the correspondence of NAICS with 502 
the SIC system because categories changed. Second, it could be improved if empirical tests can 503 
be conducted at even more disaggregated data level. Particularly, the heterogeneity of different 504 
sub-sectors within the textile and apparel industries might also cause the insignificance of the 505 
estimation results. Third, the study might be improved if the interactions between the textile 506 
industry and the apparel industry can be taken into consideration. In this study, the relationship 507 
between imports and the operation of the U.S. textile and apparel industries were evaluated based 508 
on products within the same NAICS-code sector, while future study may take cross-sector 509 
connections into consideration. Last but not least, structure of the empirical model can be further 510 
improved by taking the potential existence of stochastic trends in the dataset into consideration. 511 
With the presence of stochastic trends, the dataset will be non-stationary and may lead to biased 512 
estimation even when time trend variable t is included in the model. As one solution, the Dickey-513 
Fuller test or related tools may be used in the future to detect the potential existence of stochastic 514 
trends.      515 
Note 516 
1. In this study, the U.S. textile industry covers NAICS 3131 (Fiber, yarn and thread), NAICS 517 
3132 (Fabrics) and NAICS 3133 (Fabric finishing and coating); the U.S. apparel industry 518 
covers NAICs 3151 (Knitted apparel), NAICs 3152 (Cut and sew apparel) and NAICS3159 519 
(Apparel accessories).   520 
 
 
2. The “insignificant” results may be due to two major reasons. First, quota elimination may 521 
exert more significant impact on the country structure of import sources rather than the 522 
overall import volume which is more closely related to macro economic conditions (Nordas, 523 
2004). Second, the largest textile and apparel exporter to the United States—China, was still 524 
subject to quota restriction for many of its most competitive products until the end of 2008.  525 
3. Under the Berry Amendment, clothing, fabrics, fibers, yarns or other made-up textiles 526 
procured by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) need to be 100% made in the United 527 
States (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011). 528 
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    Table 1 (A) Results of Random Effect Model on the U.S. Textile Industry 
(1 )itLn IPR−  Productivity 
( )itLn A  
Employment 
( )itLn L  
Wage 
( )itLn W
 
Market price 
( )itLn P  
GDP 
( )tLn Y  
Quota  
quota  
Time 
t  
Textile     
    industry 
-0.018 
(0.06) 
-0.179** 
(0.04) 
0.17 
(0.54) 
0.50 
(0.45) 
-0.23 
(1.09) 
0.08 
(3.75) 
-2.52 
(7.31) 
Constant: 6.01(135.02)* 
P-value for F-test of overall significance: 0.00** 
  * denotes p<0.05, **denotes p<0.01. 
Table 1 (B) Results of Fixed Effect Model on the U.S. Apparel Industry 
(1 )itLn IPR−  Productivity 
( )itLn A  
Employment 
( )itLn L  
Wage 
( )itLn W
 
Market price 
( )itLn P  
GDP 
( )tLn Y  
Quota  
quota  
Time 
t  
Apparel    
    industry 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(0.52) 
-0.50* 
(0.22) 
-0.12 
(0.57) 
-2.15 
(1.92) 
0.19 
(3.33) 
Constant: 82.03 (66.5) 
P-value for F-test of overall significance: 0.00** 
* denotes p<0.05, **denotes p<0.01. 
 
       
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Model of the Relationship Between Import Penetration and the Operation of 
the U.S. Textile Industry1 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Two other things need to be noted in Figure 1, although they will not be tested in this paper. First, the U.S. 
domestic textile industry is not only directly competing with textile imports, but also competes directly with 
imported apparel which uses non-U.S.-made textile products, although in an indirect way. With the quick rise of 
apparel imports since the 1990s, output of the U.S. apparel industry first started to decline and then followed up by 
the U.S. textile industry.  This pattern suggested that a good proportion of prior U.S. domestic demand for textiles 
disappeared because of the shrinkage of U.S. domestic apparel production as the result of rising apparel imports. 
Second, the U.S. textile industry also competes with foreign-made textiles in third-country markets such as Mexico 
and Central-South American countries (Gereffi, 2002). 
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Figure 2 Conceptual model of the Relationship between Import Penetration and the Operation of 
the U.S. Apparel Industry 
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